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148 In Defense of Miracles 
and are to be expected given a widely held view of divine agency in the 
miraculous. Moreover, Van Till's characterization of narrow naturalism 
either is question-begging or represents a misunderstanding of divine 
action in the areas of investigation listed throughout this chapter (for 
example, the origin of first life). It is question-begging because advocates 
of theistic science do not view the origin of life, various kinds of life and 
so forth as involving solely natural capacities and physical interactions, 
and they see no sufficient evidence to change their minds. Alternatively, 
it is a misunderstanding because Van Till incorrectly locates a main 
intellectual drive toward theistic science in the conflation between two 
sorts of naturalism and not, as we have seen, where it should be. It is up 
to him to show clear examples of how this confusion on the part of 
advocates of theistic science figures essentially into their position. 
In this chapter I have not had the space to defend libertarian agency 
for human or divine (primary causal) action, though I obviously think 
such a defense is possible. Instead I have tried to show that the claim that" 
miracles are in principle outside the bounds of science is one that is 
embedded in an attitude that includes a complementarian, methodologi-
cal naturalist view of science and reality, along with a compatibilist view 
of human and divine action in the natural world (outside salvation 
history). This, in turn, has led many to reject the presence of gaps 
requiring theistic explanation because, among other things, the back-
drop just mentioned denies that such gaps exist. By contrast, while I 
would not limit the use of theistic science to the employment of direct, 
primary causal acts of God, it seems to me thatifsuch acts have occurred 
in certain cases, and if libertarian agency is a good model for charac-
terizing such acts, then there will, in fact, be gaps in the causal fabric that 
are irreducibly nonnatural and must be recognized as such within 
scientific practice. Whether or not miracles are outside the bounds of 
science, then, turns in part on our model of divine agency, which in turn 
can be understood on the basis of an analogy with human action. 
Complementarians may reject libertarian agency, but even if they do it 
should be clear why some of us who accept the libertarian model believe 
that the recognition of miracles can be part of scientific practice. 
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T HE PROBLEM OF MIRACLES IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE QUES-
tion of God's existence. Miracles have even been used to argue for the 
existence of God. As Douglas Geivett explains in chapter eleven, one 
type of argument for miracles depends in part on first developing a 
successful argument for God's existence. This chapter presents an ap-
proach to arguing for the existence of God in a way that sets the stage 
for arguing that miracles are possible, perhaps even probable. What is 
needed is an argument powerful enough not only to justify beliefin the 
existence of God but also to establish at least three things about the 
nature of God: 
1. God is a being powerful enough to produce events in space/time. 
2. God is an intelligence with a capacity to frame the convergence of 
events in space/time. 
3. God is a personality with the moral concern to act in history. 
As it happens, these three propositions are the conclusions of three 
traditional arguments, often used independently to justify belief in the 
reality of God. The cosmological argument concludes that there is a 
being that is the cause of all existence in space/time, the teleological (or 
design) argument that there is an intelligent designer of the universe, 
and the moral argument that objective moral judgments are supported 
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by the will of a transcendent and authoritative moral personality. Since 
these three arguments differ with respect to the precise formulation of 
the conclusion reached, they can in combination exhibit the rationality 
of believing in the existence of a moral personality with sufficient power, 
intelligence and motive to act miraculously within the world, which owes 
its existence to that same personality. 
Often these arguments are construed along lines that fit the pattern 
ofinference to the best explanation: 
1. Identify some prominent feature of reality that is puzzling and 
requires explanation. 
2. Illustrate the inadequacy of available naturalistic explanations for 
this feature. 
3. Infer the existence and activity of a supernatural being as the best 
explanation. 
Arguments that follow this pattern do not "prove" the existence of God 
in the sense that the conclusion follows necessarily from obviously true 
premises. But nothing that ambitious is really needed. If a theistic 
hypothesis is the best explanation for a sufficiently wide range of puzzling 
phenomena, then it will be most reasonable to accept that hypothesis. l 
The Cosmological Argument 
There is no single argument that might be designated the cosmological 
argument. Rather, there are numerous categories of cosmological argu-
ments, with individual versions of each.2 Many cosmological arguments 
have in common, however, the inference to an ultimate cause from the 
contingency or dependency of things. I will present one version of the 
argument and then respond to common objections. I conclude that this 
type of argument is able to withstand attacks and that we are entitled to 
hold that there is a Being with the capacity to cause events in space/time, 
thus providing the first component of a theistic basis for affirming the 
reality of miracles. 
Premise 1: Every physical object we observe to exist is contingent. This 
argument begins with a simple observation concerning the things3 we 
see and know about in the physical world around us. It is not a statement 
about everything in the universe, let alone every possible entity, but only 
about those things we actually observe (or sense perceive either directly 
or indirectly). The key element in this first premise is the notion of 
"contingency." Just what is that? Possibly Paul implies a form of tllis 
argument in Romans 1: 19-20: "What may be known about God is plain 
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to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation 
of the world God's invisible qualities-his eternal power and divine 
nature-have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been 
made, so that men are without excuse" (NIV). In this passage the phrase 
"since the creation" has not only a temporal but a causative sense that 
reinforces the "what has been made" clause. The point here is that 
everyone can see that certain things owe their existence to other things. 
Nothing we know of exists without being caused by something else in 
the universe; and these causes are themselves effects of other causes. 
Patterson Brown has described this characteristic of some causal 
relations as transitivity/ that is, A is caused by B, but only as B is caused 
by C. Electrons and galaxies only pass on or transfer whatever they have 
received as effects of other causes. Every physical object we know of 
possesses this sort of contingency: it exists and functions only as it is 
caused by other objects in tlle chain and, if Einstein is right, by every 
other factor in the whole cosmic network of these causal chains. 
Premise 2: The sequence of causally related contingent objects cannot be 
infinite. The first premise describes the universe as a system or network 
of causal chains. The point of the second premise is to indicate that this 
system, regardless of how complex and interconnected, and regardless 
of how extensive it may be, is nevertheless finite. In support of this 
conclusion, most cosmological arguments involve an appeal to analogies. 
For example, Thomas Aquinas uses the picture of a hand moving a stick 
moving a ball. But perhaps most frequently used and discussed is the 
train analogy. 
Imagine that you are introducing some alien from Alpha Centauri to 
the marvels of planet Earth. In a forest clearing in front of you is a boxcar 
moving on the tracks. Baffled, your alien buddy asks you why it is 
moving. You reply that it is pulled by a boxcar in front of it but hidden 
by the trees. "And how does that boxcar move?" the alien asks. "It is 
pulled by another boxcar," you say. And so on. 
This story invites us to imagine analogies for the various naturalistic 
scenarios that describe how it is that things exist in the real world. "The 
cosmos is a great circle of being," proposes the naturalist. But, returning 
to our story, stringing boxcars all the way around the earth until the last 
one hooks up to the first cannot explain the motion of the first boxcar. 
The naturalist persists: "The cosmos is an intricately evolved ecosystem 
in which everything is related causally to everything else." So boxcars 
clutter the world in an unimaginably complex system of railroading 
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enterprise such that in some way every other boxcar is pulling the first 
one. We still have no accounting, however, for the motion of that first 
one. 
It is tempting to settle the problem of ultimate causal explanation by 
noting that each boxcar is being pulled by the one in front of it. But this 
is where transitivity becomes crucial. It may well be true that boxcar A 
is pulled by boxcar B. But B can pull A only because B is being pulled 
by C. The pulling action ofB is transitive. It occurs only because B is, in 
turn, pulled by C. And so it is also true that A is being pulled by C. And 
C, and therefore A, is pulled by D, and so on. 
The naturalist may imagine yet another alternative. Suppose there are 
infinitely many boxcars. Or, speaking of the universe, suppose the 
naturalist says, "The causal explanation of objects in the universe is 
absbrbed in infinite complexity." But now something important be-
comes obvious. An infinity of boxcars will still leave unsolved the 
problem of explaining why the first boxcar is moving and hence why any 
are. The problem is not with the arrangement of boxcars, nor is it a matter 
of the number of boxcars. Theproblem is that no boxcar in the chain 
has the capacity to generate or initiate its own motion. It can pass on the 
pulling, but it does not initiate it. 
Likewise, the problem with everything we know of in the universe is 
its contingency. The supposition that the causal nexus is constituted by 
infinitely many contingent objects fails to be an ultimate explanation for 
the existence of any individual object in the nexus. There has been no 
full accounting for the existence of even the first item of the sequence 
currently under observation. As Thomas Aquinas summarizes: "But ifin 
efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient 
cause, neither will there be an effect nor any intermediate efficient causes; 
all of which is plainly false.,,5 
Conclusion: There must be a first cause of the system of contingent objects 
in causal sequence. Where does this argument lead? The appropriate 
conclusion may be inferred without effort. If the causal sequence is finite, 
as it must be, then there is a first cause. If there are finitely many boxcars 
in motion, then there is a first ( or last depending on which way you look 
at it). Perhaps it is not obvious that the first cause must be God. The 
apostle Paul, however, observes that we know both the "eternal power" 
and the "divine nature" of God. Thomas Aquinas simply concludes that 
"it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause to which everyone gives 
the name of God.,,6 But can we conclude that the first cause is God? 
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The concept of "first cause" has two implications. To say that it is the 
first cause is to say that it neither requires nor has a cause itself. First is 
first! Thus it is fundamentally different from every other cause inside the 
system: it is not contingent. It depends on, is limited by or exists because 
of absolutely nothing else. This first cause does not merely pass on 
causality in a transitive relation; rather, it literally initiates the causality. 
The apostle's phrase "divine nature" is literally "God-ness," which 
conveys the idea of nondependence. 
To say of the conclusion that it is the first cause is to define its relation 
to everything else in the sequence, namely, that it is their cause. It is the 
cause of all things in the sequence in that it initiates all of the causal 
activity in the sequence, without forbidding that each cause is, in fact, 
the cause of the next one in the sequence. The only explanation for the 
imagined moving line of boxcars is that somewhere there is a locomotive 
powerful enough to pull the whole train, an engine that does not itself 
need to be pulled. This seems to be included in Paul's notion of eternal 
(all-there-ever-is) power. And so the concept of a first cause is richer than 
it might at first appear. It is the actual cause of the existence of everything 
in the universe, and it itself exists without any cause or dependency 
whatsoever. This we may indeed call "God." 
Objections Considered 
We can clarify the conclusion just reached by dealing with some major 
objections to this argument. One of the most frequent is that the 
conclusion of the argument still does not look much like God. Certainly 
it is not the triune God of the Bible, who seeks our relationship and 
worship. Walter Kaufmann, for example, concludes his discussion of 
Thomas Aquinas's arguments by remarking, "Clearly, the God of Aqui-
nas' theology is not the God ofJob, Moses, or Jesus.,,7 How are we to. 
derive God's personhood, love, holiness, uniqueness or otherness from 
the meager conclusion of the above argument? "God" appears in the 
cosmological argument merely as a nondescript causal power behind the 
universe. 
Arguably, the cosmological argument does not yield a full concept of 
God. But the argument is sufficient to show that the naturalist judgment 
that the physical universe is all there is is clearlywrong.8 There is at least 
one thing in the causal network that is not another contingent object 
and on which everything else depends. We should also note that the 
cosmological argument has sometimes been extended by drawing out 
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the implications of the idea of an uncaused cause.9 I have not attempted 
this here since my project is to elucidate a concept of God sufficient for 
establishing the possibility, perhaps even the probability, of miracles. This 
project begins with a cosmological argument that shows that there is a 
nonnatural agency capable of producing events in space/time. 
Another criticism simply rejects all arguments against an infinite 
sequence by noting that an infinite mathematical series is logically 
possible. "One wonders why, if there can be infinite sequences in 
mathematics, there could not be one in causality," says Michael Martin.lo 
But Martin's inference is unfounded. First, supposing the actual exis-
tence of infinitely many numbers does not affect the above argument for 
a necessarily finite causal nexus, for, presumably, the relation between 
elements in the number series is not causal. Furthermore, we should not 
confuse logical possibilities with actual realities. While it is perhaps 
conceivable that there are infinitely many causes in the chain of objects 
constituting the physical universe, the mere conceivability of this does 
nothing to recommend it to us for belief. Not everything that can be 
conceived should be believed, otherwise one would be obliged to believe 
two contradictory propositions just so long as both are conceivable. 
When faced with the choice of believing one or another of two contra-
dictory propositions, both of which are conceivable, one should believe 
the proposition with the greater explanatory power. 
Paul Edwards, another atheist, argues that what we encounter in the 
real world are complete causes such that there is no reason for thinking 
that the system of causes must be finite. That is, knowing that A is caused 
by B is enough to explain A, and we are not required to ask questions 
about C. The real world is more like a string oflocomotives, he thinks.ll 
Here there is a failure to appreciate the real nature of contingency and 
how this relates to causality in the actual world. No physical object we 
know ofis like a locomotive; that is, nothing explains its own existence. 
This is the point of calling each individual physical object we observe 
"contingent." Nothing fully explains the existence of anything else by 
itself Our universe is less like a sequence oflocomotives than a sequence 
ofboxcars.u 
In his highly acclaimed book A Brief History of Time) Stephen W. 
Hawking suggests that space/time may be closed, "self-contained, 
having no boundary or edge," and that this would eliminate any need 
for a creatorP But this is just to assert that a circle of boxcars could 
explain the motion of anyone of them. Robin Le Poidevin points out 
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that whether linear or circular, the system cannot account for itself.14 The 
problem, again, is the contingency of every object in the system, not the 
specific arrangement of the contingent causes. 
Other criticisms are directed at the principle of causality, a principle 
common to all cosmological arguments. The complaint is that the 
argument either explicitly or tacitly assumes the principle that existence 
needs an explanation. But the force of the term needs has been variously 
understood. In some forms of the cosmological argument (Leibniz's is 
the famous example), the principle is construed as logically necessary. 
But it has often been argued that no such principle can or could be 
established as a point oflogic. l5 The principle is at the very least, however, 
an empirical, scientific generalization about the facts of the physical 
world, a principle whose unexceptionable character we rely on in the 
practice of science. While the success of the principle in scientific practice 
provides a weaker basis for accepting the principle than would be the 
case if it was an a priori deliverance of reason, this principle does 
effectively govern rational decision-making. It would be a form of special 
pleading, then, to prohibit appeal to the principle of causality in our 
cosmological argument for the existence of God. 
There are other lesser objections to this argument that do not, as far 
as I can tell, endanger it. Here, then, is a strong argument for the 
conclusion that there is a first cause of objects constitutive of the physical 
universe. This is the first point needed in affirming the action of God in 
history by means of a miracle. 
The Teleological Argument 
This argument is probably the oldest, simplest, shortest and easiest to 
understand of all the theistic arguments. It is based on the common 
perception that the universe, taken either as a whole or as some part of 
it, has features that are too complex to have occurred by chance. They 
must, therefore, have an intelligent source. Richard Swinburne points 
out that there is no question about the validity of the logic of this 
argument. l6 It is based on an analogy between the natural universe and 
machines. The most famous example of this type of analogy comes from 
William Paley's classic work Natural TheologyP Suppose, walking along, 
we discover a shiny object on the ground. We observe first the precise 
and regular motion of the hands and then discover inside the object an 
incredible array of gears, springs and levers, all working together to tell 
the exact time of day. 
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What should we conclude? Should we be amazed at what the elements 
can produce by chance? Surely not. We infer that a device with such 
intricate design, which carries out such precise means to an end, cannot 
simply have occurred without the aid of a designer. Paley draws a parallel 
between the watch example and the universe: "Every indication of 
contrivance, every manifestation of design which existed in the watch, 
exists in the works of nature, with the difference on the side of nature 
being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all compu-
tation.,,18 The teleological or design argument notes the intelligent 
design of tools and machines evident in their purposiveness and func-
tionality and infers a similar intelligent design to explain similarity of 
purposiveness and functioning in the natural order. 
Premise 1: The universe has features that exhibit functional and pur-· 
posive structure. It is a simple observation that the natural universe 
includes elements that in their complex structure are means to an end. 
These complexities often lend themselves very nicely to a quantitative 
approach. In particular, the probability of these complexities may be 
measured statistically, and this avoids the pitfall of circularity. 
The formulation of the design argument sketched here avoids certain 
problems associated with arguments about the universe as a whole. There 
are two problems here, both pointed out long ago by David Hume,l9 
and both of which, though they can be overcome, only invite unneces-
sary difficulty. One problem is that we know too little about the universe 
as a whole to make any comparisons between it and machines. Moreover, 
since we know of only one universe, our basis for comparison is too small. 
The other problem is that the universe is full of examples of evil, chaos, 
disorder and apparently useless things (like the panda's tl1Umb) that 
would also have to be explained as part of a universal analogy. We will 
return to these concerns shortly. 
Premise 2: Features of the universe exhibiting functional and purposive 
structure cannot be explained by chance. Since we can calculate the 
probability of an event's occurrence, we can attach specific values to 
natural phenomena to indicate whether they might occur as a result of 
the normal randomness permitted by the laws of physics, that is, by 
chance. A few examples of the kinds of probabilities involved are needed 
here to indicate just how strong this argument is. 
Fine-tuning. A great deal has been learned in recent years about the 
adaptedness of the universe to human life. Despite tlle innumerable 
possibilities of getting it wrong and the incalculable complexities of 
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systems needed to make human life work, the cosmos got everything 
right. Hugh Ross, in a recent collection of evidence relevant to the 
teleological argument, lists fifty-seven examples of such "fine-tuning," 
each of which by themselves would be enough to suggest intelligent 
design. The probability of their accidentally occurring together is infini-
tesimally small. Here are a few examples of conditions that had to be met 
in order for life to arise on our planet.20 
1. Mass density of the universe 
If larger: too much deuterium from big bang, hence stars burn 
too rapidly 
If smaller: insufficient helium from big bang, hence too few heavy 
elements forming 
2. Polarity of the water molecule 
If greater: heat of fusion and vaporization would be too great for 
life to exist 
If smaller: heat of fusion and vaporization would be too small for 
life's existence; liquid water would become too inferior a solvent 
for life chemistry to proceed; ice would not float, leading to a 
runaway freeze-up 
3. Oxygen quantity in atmosphere 
If greater: plants and hydrocarbons would burn up too easily 
Ifless: advanced animals would have too little to breathe 
We must stress that these precise conditions themselves do not exist in 
isolation. They are all related to one another and dependent on the laws 
of physics in general .. Not only did the universe get everything right when 
the slightest deviation at innumerable points would have eliminated the 
possibility of life, but the universe appears to have been preadapted for 
life. 
DNA. The investigation of DNA is another rich source of evidence 
of design. Physicists Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe, com-
menting on just one phase of the development of DNA, concluded in 
1981: 
The trouble is that there are about two thousand enzymes, and the 
chance of obtaining them all in a random trial is only one part in 
(1020)2000 = 1040,000, an outrageously small probability that could not 
be faced even if the whole universe consisted of organic soup. If one 
is not prejudiced . . . that life originated on the Earth, this simple 
calculation wipes the idea entirely out of court.21 
The crucial thing about DNA is that it has to exist before there are 
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intelligent creatures, and yet it has the character of encoded information 
which can only be produced by an intelligence.22 Thus, it too demands 
that there be an intelligence external to any developing system. 
Conclusion: There is an intelligent source of the functional and purposive 
structures in the universe. Let us be clear about the conclusion. Again, it 
must be obvious that our conclusion falls short of the God of the Bible. 
Many of David Hume's criticisms of the design argument make this very 
point. The argument does not entail that there is only one God, let alone 
that God is unqualifiedly good or unlimited. It is best to acknowledge 
these limitations of the argument and assimilate the argument into a total 
cumulative case for the existence of God. All that really follows from the 
design argument sketched here is that certain features of the universe 
could not have been produced by chance processes internal to the 
universe and that the actual source must have an intelligence beyond 
anything we can imitate or even imagine. That is all that we need in order 
to satisfY the second point required as a rational basis for affirming the 
reality of miracles. And the argument from design to this somewhat 
modest conclusion is further strengthened by the background evidence 
for the existence of the first cause referred to in the cosmological 
argument. 
Objections considered. Analogical arguments can be perfectly good 
arguments; we use them all the time, many times a day. My choice of 
each word on tllis page as I write involves comparing contexts and 
situations in the past with my present needs, and this involves the making 
of analogies. Some of these choices will be better than others. Some will 
be just right, but some will be inappropriate, based on bad or insufficient 
evidence. This suggests the two fundamental ways that analogies may be 
weakened or discredited as inductive inferences. They may rest either on 
biased, selective or partial evidence, or else on inconclusive or insufficient 
data. The objections addressed below fit these two categories. 
Some objections to the design argument stem from the presence of 
evil in the world alongside features of "design." This is not the place for 
a full-scale response to the notorious "problem of evil." Notice, however, 
that the presence of evil in the universe is irrelevant to the specific 
conclusion drawn in the above use of the design argument. The argu-
ment says nothing about the goodness of God; it only infers an intelligent 
source of design in the universe. Even if there were only one thing in the 
universe that manifested a high degree of complexity, and everything else 
was chaotic, meaningless, even evil, then there would still be enough 
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evidence to support our conclusion that there is an intelligent designer. 
Another frequent objection is that no ~atter how great the complex-
ity of the structure may be, a finite number of microchanges may be all 
that is needed to yield that complexity; thus a completely random process 
of evolution remains an option. Richard Swinburne, however, has argued 
cogently tllat a series of small evolutionary changes only describes how 
the simple became complex; it does not explain it. In fact, he argues, 
evolution only intensifies the need for God. For it would take even more 
intelligence to produce a universe that develops in intricate patterns into 
functional complexity than it would simply to create a complex universe 
outright. An evolved universe would require the design of both means 
and ends, and not of ends alone.23 
A common current objection appeals to the multiple-worlds hypothe-
sis. John Leslie, for example, acknowledges the evidence for fine-tuning, 
but then argues that developments in quantum theory imply the exis-
tence of innumerable distinct universes of immense size within the larger 
universe. There are, as it were, enough "experiments" at universe 
production to have simultaneously produced any universe, even this very 
complex, finely tuned one, so that this is just one among many uni-
verses.24 
Hugh Ross has done an excellent job of showing that the multiple-
worlds hypothesis, in its various current forms, is not supported by 
physics.25 Still, since the existence of many worlds is a logical possibility, 
the objection deserves a fuller response. 
The hypothesis is really just a fancy form of the old given-enough-
time-anything-can-happen argument. Leslie, for example, actually re-
sorts to the analogy of a typing monkey that will eventually produce a 
transcript of a bit of Shakespearean literature if there is no limit to the 
opportunities to do so. But if the improbability of an event is so high 
that it cannot reasonably be expected to occur apart from outside input 
by an intelligent agent, then we should infer the existence of an outside 
intelligence to explain the occurrence of that event, regardless of how 
much time is available. If the monkey at the typewriter is not an agent 
with some intelligence, then there is notlling about an indefinite length 
of time at the typewriter that ensures that eventually the monkey would 
produce a Shakepearean sonnet. This is true even if it is possible that such 
monkeying around would reproduce one of Shakespeare's 154 sonnets. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful that the monkey would recognize the 
excellence ofits own artifact. So there is the added difficulty of account-
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ing for the existence of intelligences within this world of physical 
complexity, not merely the physical complexity itself. 
Leslie's argument commits a form of the "gambler's fallacy." The 
gambler acts as if the odds of getting double sixes get better with each 
role of two dice. But, of course, the odds are one in thirty-six every time 
the gambler rolls the dice, regardless of how often they are thrown or 
what has come up during previous throws, or, analogous to the state of 
affairs described by Leslie, how many pairs are thrown at the same time. 
We are left, then, with the plausible conclusion that there is an intelligent 
source of design in the universe, an agent with the ability to direct means 
to an end. This is the second requirement in providing a basis for miracles 
as set out at the beginning of tIlls chapter. 
The Moral Argument 
Of all of the arguments for God's existence, this one has received the 
least attention in the twentieth century, due primarily to the first premise. 
The argument begins by observing that there are objective moral abso-
lutes, an idea that has been thoroughly controverted in contemporary 
philosophy. Nevertheless, C. S. Lewis's moral argumenf6 offers a unique 
analysis of moral behavior from an empirical, observational standpoint 
that is, I am convinced, essentially correct. The version outlined here 
draws heavily on it.· 
Premise 1: Morality is an objective feature of our universe. Certainly, 
this point is difficult to prove. Lewis's argument is based on the 
character of human moral language. It is simply impossible, he 
reasons, for the larger context of social discourse to occur without 
making statements about what is right or wrong or without assuming 
that they are true or false. I agree with J. L. Mackie, an atheist, that 
our basis for this premise is observationa1.27 Hence, it is logically 
possible that we are misled about all this even though it seems 
undeniably true. What I mean is that we simply must affirm objective 
moral values in order to make sense of our lives. That Adolf Hitler 
and Joseph Stalin were not really morally wrong, that we cannot judge 
a society to be truly guilty if it practices genocide or if it causes 
needless environmental damage are such repugnant proposals that we 
find it impossible to believe that they could be true. 
Are the moral judgments we make every day about ourselves and 
about others emotive outbursts or conditioned patterns of behavior?28 
While we often hear this judgment expressed, it is doubtful that reason-
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able people really believe it. That the brutal slaughter of children is 
revolting, horrifYing and antisocial but not immoral or wrong is non-
sense. To assert that those who pass judgment on the slaughter of the 
innocent are just being intolerant is ridiculous. The claim is even 
self-defeating, for tolerance is itself assumed to be an objective, unexcep-
tionable moral value. 
Premise 2: Naturalistic «explanations» of the objectivity of morality are 
inadequate. This point is not especially controver,sial. Most naturalists 
concede it. Since any form of naturalistic evolution denies human 
freedom, it must deny responsibility, and hence it cannot be that my 
actions have any value.29 For B. F. Skinner, all that remains is a "technol-
ogy of behavior. " Our values are arbitrary judgments. They are decisions 
that we make. Only persons who have the freedom to select views and 
actions can have the requisite insight to make moral choice possible and 
to actually decide on moral values or actions for themselves. 
Social explanations of moral objectivity do not account for moral 
value. While it is often asserted that values derive from our society, 
culture, religion, parents, school and friends, at least two arguments 
show this to be wrong. First, we often think it plausible to make 
evaluative moral judgments about our own peers, as well as other 
societies. We could not, for example, evaluate Hitler's Germany if this 
were not so. Second, the fact that as free persons we are all equal makes 
it impossible for anyone finite person to determine value for any other 
person. No other human person has the moral authority to make 
decisions about right or wrong for me.30 This, however, leads to a 
dilemma. Only persons can be the source of values, yet no finite and 
socially conditioned person is in a position to determine authoritatively 
the values appropriate for other persons. So, if there really are objective 
values, there must be some "ultimate" person who has the moral 
authority to set the standards of right and wrong. We are thus driven to 
the following conclusion. 
Conclusion: There must be a universal personal authority that is the 
source of morality. What is crucial about this argument is its implication 
that the source of this feature of the universe is a personality, at least in 
the sense required by the capacity to understand value and make free 
moral judgments. There is, of course, more to the concept of "person," 
but this is enough to show that there is a transcendent agent capable of 
moral concerns, decisions and actions that is the third component in 
providing a basis for miracles as indicated above. 
162 In Defense of Miracles 
Objections Considered 
I have dealt with standard objections to the moral argument in the 
process of spelling it out. We can summarize them by saying that the 
current naturalistic orientation to philosophy, and our culture in general, 
makes it difficult to deal adequately with any of the principal concepts: 
value, person, freedom, choice, even right and wrong. All are alien to a 
naturalistic worldview. In the end, however, this says more about the 
poverty of this worldview than it does about the soundness of the moral 
argument. It is highly unlikely that our experience that lies behind these 
concepts is empty. Thus the moral argument seems quite secure. 
Conclusion 
We are, then, entitled to assurance that God exists and in particular that 
there is a God who can act intelligently and with moral concern within 
human history. The design argument and the moral argument each adds 
to our understanding of the nature of God, as given in the cosmological 
argument. If God is the cause of all contingent existence, then God is 
the cause of all properties of contingent objects as well. Thus we have a 
cumulative case for God's existence and a methodology for filling out 
our understanding of God's nature.3l 
Of course, the argument developed here does not give us a complete 
concept of God. But if God is infinite, then no argument or combination 
of arguments could give us a full concept. As William Alston observes, 
"It is the common teaching of all the higher religions that God is of a 
radically different order of being from finite substances and, therefore, 
that we cannot expect to at1;ain the grasp of His nature and His doings 
that we have of worldly objects.,,32 Nevertheless, we do have a concept 
of God sufficiently rich to meet the three requirements established at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
The piece that is still missing, however, is knowing that God has in 
fact entered space/time and thus has acted in human history. How this 
is to be understood, as well as how such miracles have occurred, is 
discussed in ensuing chapters. 
TEN 
GOD'S 
ACTIONS 
STEPHEN T. DAVIS 
ONE OF THE CENTRAL CLAIMS OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT IS THAT GOD 
acts in history. At least some of the events that occur in history-particu-
larly (but not exclusively) miraculous events-occur because God brings 
them about. God, then, is an agent in human history and in human lives. 
God is a God who acts. Thus the God of Christianity is not the God of 
deism. Deism was a loosely defined philosophical and religious move-
ment that thrived in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and in America in the eighteenth. For the deists, religion was limited to 
a few rationally demonstrable truths about God, the creation and. 
morality. These truths included the existence of God, who created the 
universe, along with its immutable natural laws. But one crucial point 
where the deists differed from traditional Christian thought is that they 
rejected all robust notions of divine agency in the world. Indeed, they 
denied as superstitious all claims of direct interaction between God and 
the created world. Miracles, revelations, epiphanies and incarnations 
were all ruled out. Later deists suggested that God is like someone who 
winds a clock and then lets it run on its own without interference. 
Here are three traditional Christian propositions about God: 
1. God is immaterial. 
